This article analyzes whether emerging nations are extending their influence across the UNESCO World Heritage Committee and, if so, how this affects decision-making processes concerning the inscription of sites on the World Heritage List. We use both quantitative and qualitative approaches to identify patterns in decision-making processes regarding inscriptions at the World Heritage Committee sessions. Our results suggest that in the last decade, a group of emerging powers including China, South Africa, Russia, and India has dominated the UNESCO World Heritage decision-making process. At the same time, our results suggest an increasing 'politicization' of decisions emerging from the polarization of positions concerning the role and legitimacy of Advisory Bodies' technical recommendations. Our finding contributes to discussions of the role and contribution of the BRICS countries in challenging the existing structures of multilateral governance by presenting the example of World Heritage, UNESCO's self-proclaimed flagship program.
Introduction
Adopted in 1972 by the UNESCO General Conference, the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (the Convention) represents an international effort that seeks to encourage the identification, protection, and preservation of cultural and natural heritage considered to be of outstanding value to humanity. This international agreement is rooted in the recognition that protection of cultural and natural heritage of outstanding universal value (OUV) often remains incomplete at the national level, as countries lack the economic, scientific, and technological resources for preservation. The implementing mechanism envisioned by the Convention for identifying heritage sites of 'OUV' to humanity is based on the inscription of sites on the World Heritage List (the List). Inscriptions of cultural and natural sites on the World Heritage List are the result of a selection process that occurs during the annual World Heritage Committee meetings. Here, experts from UNESCO's official Advisory Bodies (International Council on Museums and Sites [ICOMOS] and International Union for Conservation of Nature [IUCN] ) present technical evaluations. However, the 21 States Parties elected to the World Heritage Committee make the final decision. Since entering into force in 1975, the World Heritage Convention has enabled a growing system of international cooperation for the protection and promotion of heritage sites on the List. Today, the Convention is considered the foremost international legal instrument for the protection of global heritage of OUV (Titchen 1996 , Jokilehto and Cameron 2008 , Labadi 2013 . As of 2015, some 191 countries have ratified the Convention and a total of 1007 properties have been inscribed on the World Heritage List.
In the last two decades, the World Heritage Convention has been increasingly subjected to criticism by the World Heritage Committee members and other States Parties (Askew 2010 , Brumann 2012 , Meskell 2012 . The List has been long recognized to be unbalanced with regard to the type of inscribed properties and the geographical areas of the world that are represented (Labadi 2007 , Bertacchini et al. 2011 , Frey and Steiner 2011 , Labadi 2013 . The great majority of inscriptions are cultural sites and most World Heritage is located in developed regions, in particular in Europe and North America (UNESCO 2007) . In this respect, some commentators have stressed how criteria for site inclusion may be culturally biased, notably toward Western conceptions of heritage (Musitelli 2002) . Furthermore, European and North American States Parties have been elected for a far greater number of terms in the World Heritage Committee than countries from other world regions (Strasser 2002) .
While Western and developed countries have long dominated the World Heritage arena, it has been noted that in the last years there has been an increasing 'politicization' of the selection process by States Parties. This is evident both in terms of the disagreement between expert evaluations and the decisions of the World Heritage Committee, and the polarization of positions between Committee members in the site selection process (Jokilehto 2011 , Meskell et al. 2015 . As a result, the listing of properties increasingly reflects national rather than global interests (Ashworth and van der Aa 2006) . One possible reason for this is that, similar to other UN platforms and international organizations, decision-making within the UNESCO World Heritage Committee is witnessing a shift toward greater multipolarity (Wade 2011 , Hale et al. 2013 . As many developing and transitional countries have grown faster than developed countries in the last decade, these new and emerging players are taking advantage of global heritage issues in the international arena to pursue their strategic national interests (Bayne 2011) .
Since the pioneering work of Cox et al. (1973) , an extensive literature has addressed both qualitatively and quantitatively how political influence and positioning of states affect the decision-making process within international organizations. One set of studies has analyzed voting behavior and decision-making in international organizations to assess competition between blocs and the role of dominant countries, with particular reference to United States (Voeten 2000, Hug and Lukács 2014) . Other studies have highlighted how nations linked through trade or aid to the United States or G7 countries are likely to align in their voting patterns with the dominant state's preference in international arenas (Kuziemko and Werker 2006 , Dreher et al. 2008 , McKeown 2009 , Stone 2011 , Dreher and Sturm 2012 . More salient for our analysis, recent scholarship has also demonstrated how influence has evolved and been exerted in international organizations by emerging powers, in particular by those countries subsumed under the acronym of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). BRICS was first coined at Goldman Sachs (O'Neill 2001) for those nations at a similar stage of newly advanced economic development and the subsequent shift in global economic power away from the older-styled developed G8 countries (Meskell , 2012 .
In terms of BRICS's cohesion as a group, Mielniczuk's (2013) analysis of the opening speeches of the BRICS leaders to the UNGA since the 1990s shows a pattern of discourse alignment over the years, projecting a common vision over several issues in global foreign policy. These include the need to restructure the institution of economic global governance, reform of the UN Security Council, and a concern against the perils of a unipolar world. Moreover, Ferdinand's (2014) analysis of voting patterns and vote cohesion in the UNGA from 1974 to 2011 has also shown a consistent pattern within the BRICS nations. He highlights a closer alignment since 2010, just one year after the first BRICS summit took place in Russia in 2009. While Ferdinand noted that the cohesion is not complete and there has been some divergence over two particular issues (namely, human rights and disarmament), even in those cases, the degree of divergence has decreased over the past decade. Relevant here is that BRICS countries show a high convergence in foreign policy within the UNGA, and that this phenomenon has increased since the creation of the BRICS summits that have transformed what was a externally-imposed financial categorization into a political grouping (Stuenkel 2014) .
One common feature of such literature is the focus on decision-making within intergovernmental organizations where countries' interests can more easily be assessed through voting behavior or indirect economic implications of final decisions. By contrast, UNESCO's 1972 World Heritage Convention and the characteristics of its decision-making process make political influence more difficult to define than in the articles cited above. In particular, decisions in the World Heritage Committee are mainly made through consensus and multilateral negotiations among its members rather than with systematic voting procedures. This particular feature complicates scholarly efforts to identify patterns of interest alignment and national influence.
We suggest that there is a need to develop different metrics to assess the modes through which countries exert their influence. More precisely, we use a quantitative and qualitative approach to analyze patterns in decision-making processes regarding inscriptions at the World Heritage Committee sessions. On the quantitative side, we collected information from the summary records and other World Heritage Committee official documents for the period of [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . For each nomination, we tracked the Advisory Bodies' recommendation, the content and the number of interventions by States Parties during the discussions of the site's nomination, and the final decision by the World Heritage Committee. We also analyzed the number of national delegates present at each World Heritage Committee session. Unlike other quantitative studies which investigate patterns in the selection of properties for the whole period of activity of the World Heritage Convention (Bertacchini and Saccone 2012 , Steiner and Frey 2012 , Frey et al. 2013 , Reyes 2014 , the data presented in this article focuses on a shorter time frame of analysis (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) . However, it also provides more detailed information on the procedural and substantive aspects of the decision-making process.
Through our quantitative analysis, we also offer more multifaceted evidence of states' activity and power position within the World Heritage Committee. For each country, we consider the number of sites nominated, committee tenure, delegation size, and several measures of verbal interventions. We then employ cluster analysis linking the different dimensions of country characteristics to identify homogenous groups of States Parties in terms of power position and influence within the World Heritage committee. We complement the interpretation of our results through a qualitative approach, based on observations of four sessions of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee (2011 , as well as interviews with senior UNESCO officials and representatives of national delegations. Along with other anthropologists researching UN organizations (Bendix 2013 , Müller 2013 ) and political negotiations, especially within UNESCO (Brumann 2012 , Schmitt 2012 , Bjerregaard and Nielsen 2014 , we are interested in how organizations such as UNESCO have global impacts, albeit in often unexpected and unpredictable ways that are not always revealed in official agendas.
Our results suggest that in the last decade, a restricted group of emerging powers including China, South Africa, Russia, and India has dominated UNESCO World Heritage decision-making processes, using both formal and informal influence to enhance the international recognition of their heritage. At the same time, we find clear evidence for a polarization of positions between different groups of committee members arising from the challenge mounted against the technical experts' recommendations for site selection.
The article contributes to the cultural policy literature in two ways. It addresses soft power issues in cultural international relations by revealing how states' behavior and political visions influence cultural policy outcomes at an international level. Moreover, it provides empirical data to better understand the debate concerning the governance of and tensions within the World Heritage system. Both contributions have potential policy implications for the future.
The article is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the decision-making process within the World Heritage Committee, Section 3 elaborates several dimensions of state behavior and influence specific to World Heritage system, Section 4 presents the quantitative empirical strategy, Section 5 discusses the results while Section 6 concludes by discussing emerging trends and the current debate on the resulting policy implications.
The World Heritage decision-making process
The World Heritage List consists of cultural and natural properties of 'OUV', which is defined in the Operational Guidelines of the Convention according to ten criteria detailing the specific requirements properties must meet for inclusion on the List. The composition of the World Heritage List is the outcome of two different phases -nomination and selection -and of the interacting input of three different actors -States Parties, Advisory Bodies, and the World Heritage Committee (Strasser 2002) . The nomination process relies on the initiative of the States Parties, which submit nomination proposals for their heritage sites to be included on the List. Experts from two Advisory Bodies, the ICOMOS for cultural properties and the IUCN for natural properties, evaluate the nomination dossiers by examining sources proving the OUV of the heritage sites. Field missions are also mobilized to assess sites' authenticity, integrity, and protection. Once the evaluation is concluded, it is sent to the World Heritage Committee, which is the final decisionmaking body composed of 21 national delegations serving four-year terms. Although the World Heritage Convention clearly states that decisions must be taken by a majority of two-thirds of its members present and voting (Art. 13.8), as in many other intergovernmental organizations, deliberations are characterized by consensus and multilateral negotiations following formal discussions and informal meetings (Reinalda and Verbeek 2004) . Decisions are necessarily prepared and prestructured, for instance, by means of drafts produced by the World Heritage Center, which acts as the Secretariat of the World Heritage Convention. During formal discussion, members of the Committee may intervene more than once for each individual nomination and may even change their position in the course of the discussion. Some nominations receive no formal discussion during the World Heritage Committee sessions and the final decisions swiftly follow the initial Advisory Body recommendation. In other more contested cases, decisions are made at the plenary session following negotiations that have taken place in specifically established working groups or during smaller informal meetings between representatives from national delegations, Advisory Bodies, and UNESCO.
Uncovering the influence of States Parties in the World Heritage Committee
In this section, we identify different dimensions of State Party behavior within the specific context of the World Heritage Committee that are connected to the political influence and the power position a country exerts in the World Heritage decisionmaking process.
Nomination activity by countries
In order to assess political influence in the decision-making process within the World Heritage system, we analyze the patterns of nomination proposals and successful inscription by the States Parties. The key outcome of the World Heritage process is the inscription of heritage sites on the World Heritage List. We suggest there is a positive correlation between the number of properties a country has on the List and its status and prominence within the World Heritage system. Thus, having a larger number of heritage sites inscribed may provide greater political recognition by other States Parties on decisions affecting World Heritage. At the international level, countries may benefit from World Heritage by signaling the quality of their cultural and natural properties, attracting further resources from international cooperation in heritage protection or marketing their World Heritage sites as tourist destinations (Johnson and Barry 1995 , Frey and Steiner 2011 , Reyes 2014 .
Since inscription depends on the ability and willingness of a country to nominate heritage properties in the List, this activity is particularly relevant to assessing the interest a country has in participating in the World Heritage arena. Today, this is crucial considering that the selection process is increasingly affected by rentseeking and political interests (Frey et al. 2013) . Although the goal of the World Heritage Convention is to protect sites of central importance for humanity, it is increasingly acknowledged that inclusion of heritage sites is often taken without following the criteria established in the Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention (Meskell et al. 2015) . In such a politicized context, and with the allegedly increased disconnection of World Heritage Committee decisions from technical expertise, the main implication is that a State Party's nomination activity is more likely to act as a proxy for its strategic political influence and power within the multilateral system. Thus, we suggest that States Parties are interested in increasing the number of nominated properties in order to achieve greater political influence in the World Heritage system.
Composition of the World Heritage Committee
According to the text of the World Heritage Convention, the composition of the Committee shall ensure an equitable representation of the different regions and cultures of the world (Art. 8.2). This provision would help in balancing the political power individual countries may exert in decisions related to World Heritage. However, despite a secret ballot procedure, political and international relations factors seem to have prevailed in affecting the composition of the World Heritage Committee. For instance, Western nations have always had a relatively dominant position in terms of seats and length of Committee mandate. Some Western countries such as France, Germany, and Italy have in the past held several consecutive mandates. Arguably, countries that are willing to see their heritage represented on the List or want to participate actively in decisions concerning World Heritage may achieve this goal more effectively by promoting their candidature to the Committee as a way to exert both formal and informal influence. Bertacchini and Saccone (2012) found a positive and statistically significant correlation between membership on the Committee, nomination activity by those same states and the likelihood of having a site inscribed. This is because membership provides the political power to push sites through the nomination process, but also because countries that are part of the Committee usually anticipate membership on the governing board and prepare their applications years before (Frey et al. 2013 ).
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As a result, serving on the World Heritage Committee may be considered as a measure of the influence a country is able to exert in the decision-making process. We suggest that the greater the number of years a country serves the Committee the greater the influence it may exert in the decision-making process.
Yet considering only the composition of the World Heritage Committee by number of seats does not fully account for the real influence nations or regional groups may wield in this governing body. The size of delegations may add useful information about the extent of the commitment and resources members of the Committee are willing to invest to actively influence and participate in World Heritage decision-making. Significantly, comparing the composition of the World Heritage Committee in terms of seats and delegation size for the period 2003-2013 suggests a different balance of power within this governing body. As shown in Figures 1 and 2 , it emerges clearly how countries from Asia and the Pacific have greatly outpaced Western nations in the number of delegates present, although European and North American countries have maintained a relative majority of seats over many years. Delegation size might thus be considered as a proxy for a State Party's informal influence. As noted by Pouliot (2011) in the context of the UN, the size of diplomatic missions, together with the presence of experienced diplomats, are necessary conditions to attain status within UN diplomatic negotiations. Moreover, having a larger delegation plays a substantial role in 'corridor diplomacy' or in managing negotiations of multiple items agenda for the achievement of desired outcome by States Parties (McKeown 2009). We suggest that the larger a nation's delegation size, the greater its informal influence in the World Heritage decision-making process.
Verbal interventions during the World Heritage Committee
Given that decisions in the World Heritage Committee are mostly taken by member consensus, the frequency and type of verbal interventions States Parties make during the formal discussions is relevant to infer their political influence in reaching specific outcomes.
Being vocal in formal discussions may serve different purposes. First, considering the short time the Committee spends on each nomination, verbal interventions may be helpful for a State Party to introduce additional information into the discussion or to directly influence the final decision by explicitly expressing its position. For example, during the formal sessions, Committee members may intervene in the debate to express their evaluation of a nomination. In many instances, they ask the Advisory Bodies to provide additional information concerning technical aspects of the nomination under examination. Participating in formal discussion may also be considered as a means to gain legitimization among peers in the Committee or to reinforce diplomatic ties among nations. The frequency of verbal interventions may be considered as a proxy of how Committee members actively participate in the decision-making process, and we suggest that there is positive correlation between the frequency of interventions during formal discussions and the political influence a country exerts into the final decisions of the Committee.
Considering this type of intervention, another relevant dimension to address is how States Parties of the Committee support or oppose recommendations by Advisory Bodies. While in the past the World Heritage Committee used to follow Advisory Bodies' recommendations (Pressouyre 1996) , Committee decisions have increasingly diverged from the scientific opinions of the Advisory Bodies in recent years, contributing to a drift toward a more 'political' rather than 'heritage' approach to the Convention (Jokilehto 2011 , Meskell et al. 2015 . The main contention concerns nominations that the Advisory Bodies recommend for Not Inscription, Deferral, and Referral. Such evaluations make a State Party's effort to inscribe a property more difficult and require additional time and resources to have the property inscribed in the List. Many countries describe any decision that is not to inscribe as a 'poisoned gift' -a term that delegates have used repeatedly with some disdain throughout recent Committee meetings (Meskell 2012 , Hølleland 2013 .
To illustrate, Figures The size of the nodes is proportional to the number of ties a Committee member has developed or a nominating country has received.
The two figures reveal a clear divergence in the use of verbal interventions by Committee members regarding Advisory Bodies' initial technical evaluations. On the one end, the most vocal countries challenging Advisory Body recommendations have been emerging non-Western states.
5 On the other end, Western nations have been more vocal in maintaining and supporting the technical decisions made by the Advisory Bodies. Such arguments suggest that questioning the technical evaluations may represent a means for emerging nations to raise their political influence in the selection of sites.
Empirical strategy
We use cluster analysis to identify common patterns of behavior and characteristics of countries that have served on the Committee. Considering the multifaceted dimension of political influence within the World Heritage decision-making process, this methodology is useful in drawing distinct groups of countries that can be categorized according to one or more common patterns within the World Heritage Committee. An interpretation of the results allows a better understanding of the strategies of individual States Parties.
Cluster analysis refers to a general set of statistical techniques used to form homogenous groups of objects that are described by a variety of characteristics (Everitt et al. 2001) . The optimal number of clusters is assessed through agglomerative methods that signal the most marked differences among potential clusters. As an agglomerative method, Ward's minimum-variance method is used (see Appendix 1). According to the literature (Everitt et al. 2001) , this method is superior to alternative algorithms and to provide more homogeneous clusters.
The data we collected and organized come from the summary records along with other World Heritage Committee official documents for the period 2003-2013. The summary record contains the text of verbal interventions that occurred in formal discussions at Committee sessions. For each nomination of cultural and natural properties, 6 we tracked the Advisory Bodies' recommendation, the final decision taken by the World Heritage Committee, the number of delegates, and each verbal intervention by States Parties during the sessions. This provided to a unique data set of 340 nominations for the period under examination.
The country variables we chose are the following:
• Number of years a country served the World Heritage Committee.
• Number of sites proposed by the country for inscription at Committee sessions.
• Country average number of delegates per Committee session.
• Country average number of interventions during formal Committee sessions.
• Percentage of a country's interventions supporting the upgrade in the final evaluation for nominations initially recommended by Advisory Bodies for Not Inscription, Deferral, or Referral over total country's interventions.
• Percentage of a country's interventions opposing the upgrade in the final evaluation for nominations initially recommended by Advisory Bodies for Not Inscription, Deferral, or Referral over total country's interventions.
Our analysis concerns only those countries that have held a Committee seat for at least three years in the period between 2003 and 2013. This decision was taken so as to rule out potential noise in the results from nations that were ending their mandate in the Committee at the beginning of the period or starting at the very end of it. In this way, we restrict our sample to States Parties that have served sufficiently on the Committee to be effectively involved in the World Heritage decision-making process.
Results
Using Ward's minimum-variance method, we can identify four clusters of States Parties serving on the Committee for the period 2003-2013 according to the selected variables. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics highlighting the main differences of means across clusters, which can be used to provide additional insights into an interpretative framework of the main dynamics occurring within World Heritage decision-making.
From Table 1 , we can see that Cluster 3, which includes Egypt, India, China, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, and Japan, emerges distinctively for its main characteristics.
7 This group leads in several aspects of formal and informal influence that have been identified. This includes the number of years of tenure in the World Heritage Committee (6, 6), the number of nominations to the World Heritage List presented during Committee sessions (7, 1), and the number of delegates participating at the sessions (18, 4). In terms of vocal interventions during formal discussions, countries in this group have not been, on average, the most active. However, they do show a relatively high proportion of interventions for upgrade in the final decisions for those sites initially recommended by Advisory Bodies for Not Inscription, Deferral, or Referral.
Looking at the composition of this cluster, two main features can be noted. First, it is characterized by the strong presence of Asian nations, which suggests an increasing political influence of this regional group in Committee decision-making. Second, and more significantly, in this cluster, we find Russia, India, China, and South Africa, which are part of the BRICS group. Over the past several years at least three of the four have simultaneously served on the World Heritage Committee. They seated together in the governing body from 2003 to 2005, while China, India, and South Africa served on the 2010 and 2011 World Heritage Committee and Russia, India, and South Africa in 2012 and 2013. Our results suggest that their alliance, evidenced by the 2011 Sanya Declaration 8 (Mielniczuk 2013 , Ferdinand 2014 , has enabled their inscription of new sites on the World Heritage List and ensured that potentially endangered sites also remain on that List regardless of the infrastructural development or resource extraction that threatens their conservation.
The countries in this cluster have extended both formal and informal influence in the World Heritage decision-making process mainly with the objective of using it to enable the inscription of more properties on the List and to gain international legitimization. Several facts from recent Committee sessions illustrate this trend. First, Russia, India, China, and Japan have all opposed recent efforts to prohibit nomination of sites by States Parties currently serving on the Committee. Thus, a high rate of nominations coupled with their intent to serve on the Committee is to ensure their own national properties are listed. Second, a Norwegian report to the 34th session of the Committee 9 found that over the previous 10-15 years, an increasing politicization has developed whereby politics has trumped technical expertise. The report claimed (2010, 3), for example, that China had put pressure on other members to secure their own nominated sites for inscription before formal Committee discussions, with several States Parties expressing concern.
The Russian nomination of the Bolgar Historical and Archaeological Complex (http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/981) provides a revealing example of how the multifaceted channels of political pressure that can be used to have sites inscribed on the World Heritage List (Plets 2015) . During the 2012 sessions in St Petersburg, ICOMOS recommended that Bolgar not be inscribed on the List because of significant changes to the historic structures following massive consolidation and reconstruction efforts. During those same World Heritage meetings, Russia offered to fly delegates to the nearby city of Kazan where it hosted UNESCO's Youth Day, attempting to secure multilateral support for Bolgar's nomination (Meskell et al. 2015) . During the 2013 meetings in Cambodia, a French documentary film (Bentura 2014) revealed the excessive lobbying and pressure exerted on other Committee members by the Russian ambassador. In the 2014 meetings held in Qatar, Russia strategically reframed the criterion for inscription of Bolgar as a Muslim pilgrimage site to ensure the support of many Islamic nations on the World Heritage Committee. Iraq, Qatar, Algeria, Malaysia, and the UAE backed Russia, and the site was inscribed.
From the qualitative evidence collected at Committee sessions, it is also possible to highlight some forms of the exchange of political support between countries within Cluster 3 to ensure that their economic interests might be concealed with recognition of heritage protection. The case of Mapungubwe Cultural Landscape and South Africa's maneuvering to make certain it was not placed on the List of World Heritage in Danger 10 illustrate this point. With an open cast colliery operating within Mapungubwe's proposed buffer zone, the IUCN, ICOMOS, and the World Heritage Center voiced their concerns to South Africa, sent scoping missions, and produced reports outlining the destructive impacts of the mine (Meskell 2013) . India and Russia both strongly supported South Africa in the 2012 Committee meetings held in Saint Petersburg. Russia was also facing controversy over its own property, the Virgin Komi Forests, then endangered due to state-sponsored gold mining (see 35 COM 7B.25) . With the BRICS alliance in force, the debt was repaid when Komi was discussed. This example clearly aligns with Pavone's (2008) insights confirming that members of the World Heritage Committee are, first and foremost, state representatives who are free to pursue their own national interests, maximize power, push their economic self-interest, and minimize their transaction costs. In the examples provided, national imperatives and economic necessities seem to be more binding than any ethical norms related to the international and intergovernmental responsibility over the protection of World Heritage as defined in the World Heritage Convention.
While Cluster 3 provides clear evidence of nations that have extended their influence across the UNESCO World Heritage Committee during the period 2003-2013, the analysis of both Cluster 2 and 4 points to another remarkable pattern in the World Heritage decision-making process. Countries in both Cluster 2 and 4 on average do not rate highly in terms of their influence in terms of Committee tenure, size of delegations, or number of nominations during the period of analysis. Yet these two groups have been the most vocal in formal discussions, with an average of 15.5 and 19.7 statements per session, respectively. Interestingly, though, their verbal interventions reveal dramatically divergent attitudes.
Cluster 2 is characterized by nations that have more frequently challenged the technical recommendations initially slated for Not Inscription, Deferral, and Referral by the Advisory Bodies. On average, the countries in this cluster show a share of about 35% of this type of statement over their total interventions in formal discussion. Notably, with the exception of one European country, Cluster 2 includes several emerging and developing nations, most of them belonging to the Arab States regional group. This finding is in line with the analysis by Schmitt (2012) , who highlights that during the 30th and 31st Committee sessions, countries such as Morocco and Tunisia advanced a strategy aimed at pursuing a lower degree of concordance with the requirements for inscription on the World Heritage List. A similar strategy characterized the behavior of those countries in relation to compliance with the norms of protection for inscribed sites, as detailed in his example of the site of Tipasa (Algeria) on the List of World Heritage in Danger. Schmitt argues that this situation results both from the presence of extraneous political influences (such as efforts to raise national prestige or please powerful states) and a system of 'checks and balances' affecting the decisions of Committee members. Our analyses expand the time frame of Schmitt's observations (2006 Schmitt's observations ( -2007 to the period from 2003 to 2013 and demonstrate that those countries' behavior has remained consistent over the entire decade.
At the opposite end, Cluster 4, which comprises Switzerland, Estonia, and the United Kingdom, shows quite different dynamics from Cluster 2. These nations have been very vocal in their number of interventions, especially to support the evaluations of the Advisory Bodies and to oppose proposals by others Committee members to upgrade recommendations slated for Not Inscription, Deferral, or Referral. The so-called 'neutral' nations such as Estonia and Switzerland continue to argue for scientific and expert-based decision-making. At the end of its tenure on the Committee in 2013, Estonia expressed its gratitude to the Advisory Bodies but reiterated its concern over the political pressures being exercised by national governments and the dwindling heritage expertise within the delegations. Moreover, Switzerland and Estonia have advocated that Committee members abstain from nominating sites during membership.
Finally, Cluster 1 represents a heterogeneous group of countries that do not exhibit a high position in the dimensions of political influence identified in the World Heritage context relative to the other clusters. What is relevant to highlight in this case is that this group comprise almost all the Western countries that have served on the Committee in the last decade. Crucially, some of them have been also some of the most influential States Parties in the history of the World Heritage Convention for both the number of properties inscribed in the List and their active role in the World Heritage Committee.
For example, France and Spain are among the Western countries with the highest tallies of properties on the World Heritage List. France, Australia, and the United States have been among the earliest signatories to the World Heritage Convention in 1975 Convention in , 1974 Convention in , and 1973 , respectively. They are also among the nations that have served longest on the World Heritage Committee (France for 25 years; Australia for 23 years, and the United States for 23 years). It has been acknowledged that the final form of the World Heritage Convention owes much to an earlier US proposal of a World Heritage Trust (Cameron and Rössler 2013 , Stott 2011 , whereas countries such as France and Australia have been active in envisioning strategies to solve the imbalances in the World Heritage list such as the Global Strategy 11 (Gfeller 2013 , Labadi 2005 ). Yet these nations have also been less willing to adopt the provisions of the Global Strategy (UNESCO 2011) in terms of slowing down or halting the pace of their own proposed nominations. In fact, during the period analyzed (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) those countries may have reduced their vocal influence within the Committee sessions, yet their nomination activity has remained quite stable over the years.
Concluding remarks
This article has analyzed whether emerging countries are exerting their influence across the UNESCO World Heritage Committee and how this in turn affects World Heritage decision-making.
Although an extensive literature has addressed, both quantitatively and qualitatively, how the political influence and position of states affects decision-making process within international organizations, little evidence has been produced regarding the political and economic factors that influence decisions in UNESCO World Heritage. We argue that in the World Heritage arena, political influence in decisionmaking can be studied by focusing on several context-specific dimensions of State Party behavior. More specifically, we consider the number of heritage sites nominated, committee tenure, size of delegations, and several measures of verbal interventions.
Employing both quantitative and qualitative approaches, we identify and interpret common patterns of behavior arising from different groups of countries for the period of [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . While our analysis is still based on a rather limited empirical basis, the results show two distinct patterns of politicization and polarization in which the balance of power in the World Heritage Committee is shifting toward emerging nations and is affecting specifically the decision-making process for new inscriptions on the World Heritage List. First, a restricted group of emerging nations, comprising the majority of the BRICS countries with China, South Africa, Russia, and India, has dominated the UNESCO World Heritage decision-making process using both formal and informal influence to enhance their soft power through the international recognition of their national heritage. Second, we find evidence of a polarization of positions between different groups of Committee members arising from the challenge to technical expertise involving site selection. Such polarization of attitudes arises between clear clusters of delegations, in particular the contrasting positions of Cluster 2 (made up primarily of emerging countries) and Cluster 4 (comprising the most vocal western countries), and highlights the phenomenon of mounting attacks on the institutional status quo and a situation of increasing tension taking place in the multilateral arena of UNESCO World Heritage.
We suggest that both the trends in the politicization and polarization of attitudes, underscored by our quantitative data, are due to the growing dissatisfaction with the institutional status quo and reveal a situation in which conflicts arising within the multilateral institution (UNESCO) may eventually shift toward a form of contested multilateralism 12 within the World Heritage system. While this is not currently happening, several factors point toward the need for urgent reform within the process of evaluation and decision-making for inscriptions on the World Heritage List.
In 2010, The Economist (2010) reported on the 34th session of the World Heritage Committee held in Brasilia and signaled that 'the UN agency (was) bending its own rules under pressure from member states'. In fact, during that meeting, half of the Committee was composed of new members and some of our informants attributed the changed dynamics that we observed quantitatively to this new geopolitical configuration. In 2011, during the 35th Committee session, the mounting challenges to the Advisory Bodies' recommendations by a selected group of countries (including those present in our Clusters 3 and 4) gave rise to murmurings of the imminent 'death of the Convention' , thus implying that the rising conflictual situation would damage both the viability and the prestige of the World Heritage List. In 2012, the increasing dissatisfaction of some States Parties over the Advisory Bodies' recommendation lead some national delegates to suggest that if the situation continued, alternative advisory organizations may be considered in lieu of the ones that are currently used. While none of those situations has yet materialized, there are definite signs of a high level of disagreement within the Word Heritage Committee.
Critique and reflection over the necessity of reform to World Heritage decisionmaking processes have come also from within UNESCO itself. An exemplary case is an article written by Kishore Rao (2010) , then Deputy Director (currently Director) of the World Heritage Center. Rao boldly stated that the issues related to the Committee' criticism of the Advisory Bodies highlighted systemic problems in the process of decision-making within the World Heritage System. Specifically, the current adjudicatory process is trumped by the economic interests that surround the nomination process, where states such as China invest millions of dollars in nomination dossiers and on that basis expect that such outlays will be materialized into World Heritage inscriptions. Rao suggested that a system of increased cooperation and mentoring of nomination proposals would be better suited than the actual situation where Advisory Bodies have mainly an evaluative role of nominations. This change would ultimately favor a more collaborative process between the States Parties and the Advisory Bodies.
More recently, members of the World Heritage Committee have recognized the need for internal reflection to address their increasing divergence of opinion with Advisory Bodies. In 2014, the 38th Session of the World Heritage Committee saw the level of discordance between the Advisory Body recommendations and the Committee final decision reach a new peak. Some 47% of the Advisory Bodies recommendations were overturned by the Committee and a record of 81% of nominated sites was inscribed on the List. Given this situation, the Committee decided (Decision 38 Com 13, 9) to create an informal working group at the invitation of the German delegation to discuss issues related to the working methods and evaluation processes of nomination. While the results of this working group are not yet known, our quantitative and qualitative data suggest that the conflict in question is the result of a shift of influence in the decision-making process led by a restricted group of countries including China, South Africa, Russia, and India. The new convergence of interests headed by this group of emerging states is embedded in a wider crisis within the multilateral order that according to some scholars is stalling the work of several UN organizations (Hale et al. 2013) , the effects of which have begun to be felt at the level of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee (Claudi 2011 , Meskell et al. 2015 .
Ultimately, our integrated data analysis, employing both quantitative and qualitative data, extends discussions on the role of BRICS within the UNESCO World Heritage Committee and supports claims that emerging nations are currently gaining political power in existing UN structures of multilateral governance.
Site referral occurs when some minor additional information is needed from a State
Party to supplement the original nomination. This can be provided in a short period of time and does not need to be assessed by sending a new expert mission to the property. Deferral entails additional information from, or actions needed by, the State Party that is major. This would lead to a substantial revision of the nomination and thus a new or substantially revised nomination dossier and would need to be assessed by sending a new mission to the property. 2. Recently, there have been concerted efforts to prohibit nomination of sites by States Parties currently serving on the Committee, but the Committee itself has vetoed this recommendation. The matter is raised each year with nations such as Finland, Switzerland, and Estonia advocating abstention during membership, whereas Turkey, Russia, India, China, and Japan, to name a few, take the opposite position. 3. As States Parties in the World Heritage Committee may propose nominations, the same country may appear in the figures both as a dark gray squared node (Committee member) or a light gray rounded node (nominating country). However, according to Operational Guidelines, a Committee member is not entitled to intervene in the formal discussion when one of its nominations is under examination. 4. A verbal intervention supporting the upgrade of the Advisory Body initial recommendations means that the Committee members pushes the final decision toward a better final evaluation, so from Referral to Inscription, from Deferral to Referral or even Inscription, and so on. Conversely, for verbal interventions opposing the upgrade, we consider cases in which a committee member has both expressed the same Advisory Body recommendation or it has provided a lower evaluation during the formal discussion. 5. As each nomination dossier is a separate case, it is not possible to analyze quantitatively the main arguments used by Committee members to express disagreement with the Advisory Bodies recommendations. Nevertheless, from qualitative evidence collected during the past four Committee sessions, it is possible to single out some patterns: (i) difference of opinion in relation to the presence (or absence) of OUV, (ii) evaluative criteria being narrowly judged from a Western perspective, (iii) claims of the presence of factual errors in the Advisory Body recommendations that negatively influenced its final decision, (iv) minor flaws in the nomination dossier that should not slow down the inscription process. 6. We excluded from the analysis nominations of mixed properties owing to divergences between Advisory Bodies recommendations or in the final decision of the Committee regarding either the natural or cultural component of the nomination. Morse and Keohane (2014) , refers to the situation of a high level of conflictuality in multilateral institutions. This situation occurs when competing coalitions of nation states dissatisfied with the status quo couple the threat of defection with that of the creation of alternative multilateral organizations (regime shifting or competitive regime creation).
that are merged using Ward's method cannot be separated again in subsequent steps, it has been suggested that the results of the Ward technique should be corrected in an additional step. In this case, the results are checked for robustness by the use of discriminant analysis. In order to determine the optimal number of clusters, the criterion of agglomeration schedule is employed. The agglomeration schedule, as shown in Table A1 , reveals increases in the distances at each step of the fusion process.
High increases in the distance levels suggest an optimal number of clusters, since they signal the most marked differences among potential clusters. Gaps in the distance levels can be found from clusters 6 to 5, 4 to 3, and 2 to 1. Therefore, several cluster solutions can be at stake. The choice of the four-clusters solution is chosen because, except for a two cluster alternative, it provides the second best solution in terms of highest share (91.8%) of objects classified correctly according to discriminant analysis, and it is better suited to highlight the main differences in country behavior occurring within the context of the phenomenon under study. 
